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After the coup d ’etat in 1988, the military junta, that had seized the pow­
er, changed the name o f the country from Burma into the historical, Bur­
mese language name Burmese language -  the Union of Myanmar. This 
new name is not acknowledged by most opposition groups, who believe 
that the regime lacks the legality to engage in any government function, 
including changing the name of the country. In this article I shall use the 
old and a new name of this state alternatively.
China’s cultural, economical, and political relationships with South­
east Asia have made important pattern of this region. However until the 
late 19th century, the tributary system dominated Chinese relations with 
Southeast Asia. In the 20th century, after World War II, when the policy 
o f new postcolonial states was overfilled with the spirit of Bandung Con­
ference , this ancient pattern of mutual relations rapidly changed. In 19th 
century, after the Second World War, when the policy o f new postcolo­
nial states, was overfilled with the spirit o f Bandung Conference. Ideas 
and values like nonalignment, neutrality, mutual respect and equality in 
political relations made a good background for the developing Chinese 
relationship with Southeast Asia. Nowadays, this relations is undergo­
ing a significant shift. In the 1990s , China was perceived as a threat to its 
Southeast Asian neighbors partly due to its conflicting territorial claims 
over the South China Sea and former support for communist revolts. 
This perception began to change in the wake o f the Asian financial crisis 
o f 1997/19981 when China resisted the pressure to devalue its currency, 
while the currencies o f its neighbors were in free fall. In November 2004,
1 See: Bruce Vaughn, Wayne M. Morrison, China-Southeast Asia Relations: Trends, Issues, 
and Im plications fo r  the United States, CRS Report for Congress, April 4, 2006.
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China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) agreed 
to gradually remove tariffs and create the world’s largest free trade area 
by 2010.2 China is also beginning to increase bilateral and multilateral 
security relationships with Southeast Asian states.
In ancient times the Chinese regarded Myanmar as a ‘barbarian’ king­
dom which wasn’t included within the ‘civilized’ countries that adopted 
exclusively Chinese culture.3 After World War II, when the state o f Burma 
gained independence, it attempted to maintain a public stance o f neu­
trality. Especially during the Ne Win’s era (began in 1962),4 this policy 
o f preserving Myanmar’s status as a neutral buffer state became a key 
concept o f Myanmar foreign policy. Therefore, when in 1967 the Beijing’s 
embassy in Rangoon began to encourage the local Chinese to partici­
pate in the Cultural Revolution, Ne Win’s regime prohibited these activ­
ities. It soon led to the confrontation with overseas Chinese in Burma 
and caused a rift in Sino-Burmese relations. Ne Win’s skilled personal 
diplomacy, including a visit to Beijing in 1971,5 resulted in normalizing 
the relations between Rangoon and Beijing. Although the Chinese sup­
port for the Burma Communistic Party continued to be the main point 
o f Burma’s irritation with mutual relations. Until the great Burmese 
political crisis of 1988, Chinese military’s aid for BCP was described as 
“fraternal party” relations. Since then Beijing cut back on its support for 
the BCP and began to establish closer relations with, the State Law and 
Order Restoration Council (SEOK) which seized power in a stage-mana­
ged coup d ’etat on 18th September 1988.6 The new martial law passed 
by SEOK opened up the economy to foreign business. The economically 
weak, politically divided and socially fragmented state o f Burma started 
to search in the world for external sources of economic and military sup­
port. Political isolation o f the new established military rule in Myanmar, 
and it’s cash-hungry militant government saw China as the main political 
and economical partner in the region. Even the long-held principles of 
neutrality and nonalignment in Burmese foreign policy, could not stop 
this constantly developing process. Furthermore Myanmar soon moved 
away from a nonalignment policy and has become China’s closest ally.
2 Agreem ent on Dispute Settlement Mechanism o f  the Framework Agreem ent on Compre­
hensive Economic Co-Operation Between the Association o f  Southeast Asian Nations and the 
People’s Republic o f  China, http://www.aseansec.org/16635.htm (January 29, 2012).
3 Donald M. Seekins, “Burma China Relation, Playing with Fire,” Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 6, 
June 1997.
4 Michael W. Charney, A  History o f  Modern Burma, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009, p. 107.
5 Ting Maung Maung, “Myanmar and China. A  Special Relationships?,” Southeast Asian 
Affairs, 2003, p. 189-210.
6 Ibid.
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According to Donald M. Seekins “by the mid-1990s until now, Myanmar 
seemed to be drawn increasingly into a Chinese sphere o f influence.”7 
Myanmar calls China the “Paukhpaw,” a term that means ‘sibling’ or 
‘intimate’ in Burmese.8 Moreover, this word has never been used for any 
other foreign country. It is a proof o f a strong historical and political con­
nection between those two nations. Although, most important thing is 
that this perception o f its neighbor in past, same as in the present, has 
undergone a series o f ups and downs. In the past such events like the 
invasion of Mongols army in the 13th century, which destroyed the first 
unified Burmese kingdom, and the invasion of Qing’s army in the 18th 
century evoked a strong distrust and resentment in the minds o f the de­
signers o f Myanmar’s foreign policy.9 However after the coup d ’etat when 
the military junta made a transition from socialistic economy in the era of 
Ne Win into free market system, historical resentment has become less 
important than economical interests which is beneficial for the military 
junta. The State Law and Order Restoration Council used foreign busi­
ness to consolidate military rule, but not to: “promote economic growth 
or industrialization”10 in the state. This attitude in economy has a long 
historical tradition, according to Robert Taylor: “the experience o f the 
monarchical system in Burma was such as to convince kings that they 
would be unable to control the private power which would probably have 
resulted from economic expansion and rationalization, even if this would 
have increased the overall resource base o f society and ultimately the 
state.”11 According to this pre-colonial pattern which exists in the present, 
economic, military and political relations with China soon became the 
main source of support and legitimacy of the Myanmar junta.
In economical relations the Chinese position can be seen as a domi­
nant. According to Thai source from 1995, Sino-Burmese two-way trade 
in 1994-1995 amounted to 1.2 billion USD, or 60 percent o f Burma’s total 
trade.12 It made China the major trade partner for the Union of Myanmar. 
This growing development of bilateral trade relations shows a growing 
asymmetry since 1988. It is evident that Myanmar’s import from China 
grew more rapidly than its export to China throughout the 1990s and up 
to 2005. Myanmar’s exports to China increased 1.3 times, from 133.7 mil­
lion USD in 1988 to 169.4 million USD in 2003 its import from China
7 Seekins, op. cit.
8 Toshiro Kudo, Myanmar Economic Relations with China: Can China Support the Myan­
mar Economy?, Institute o f Developing Countries, Discussion Paper No. 66, July 2006.
9 China's M yanmar Dilemma, International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 177, Septem­
ber 14, 2009.
10 Seekins, op. cit.
11 Robert H. Taylor, The State in Burma, Honolulu: University o f Hawaii Press, 1987, p. 38.
12 Seekins, op. cit.
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increased 7.1 times, from 136.2 million USD in 1988 to 967.2 million USD 
in 2003, resulting in a huge trade deficit o f 797.7 million USD in 2003.13 
Also the Chinese economic presence, which is most visible in the central 
and northern part o f the country -  the Upper Burma -  and in the fron­
tier region along the Burma-China border adjacent to Yunnan Province, 
becomes more and more unbalanced year by year. Mandalay, Burma’s se­
cond largest city, could be a good example o f this regularity. The city en­
joyed a great development due to the Chinese activity in land purchase. 
But soon it became obvious to the local Burmese that commercial center 
o f this old royal city became the so-called ‘Chinatown,’ where prices of 
property had become too high for the Burmese to afford. It forced the 
Burmese citizens to move to the city’s outskirts.
On the Chinese side o f the border, districts like Yingjiang, and Lung- 
chuang, Tengchung in Yunnan Province gain profits form bilateral trade. 
To support this trade Beijing has given the towns of Wanding and Ruili 
on the Burma-China border a special open city status. The area neigh­
boring on Ruili has been designated as a ‘special economic development 
zone.’ In the shadow of this progress stands an enormous growth of bor­
der drug trade which throughout Yunann, has been affecting the whole 
China since the 80s. Burma serves as a passageway for opium and heroin, 
and most recently also for amphetamine type stimulant, from the ‘Gold 
Triangle.’ The center o f opium and heroin production is located in the 
Kokang region in the northeast of Burma. According to David Arnott: 
“most o f the drug warlords in Burma were either born in China, are eth­
nic Chinese, or o f Chinese/Burmese parentage.”14 One of them was Ma 
Siling who was arrested after a secret operation of the Chinese police in 
his fortified villa in Pingyuan. He kept 981 kilograms of drugs there, along 
with a huge number of various weapons and his private army o f 854 peo­
ple.15 Nowadays drug trade form Myanmar to the People’s Republic of 
China causes a huge number of social problems for the Chinese govern­
ment, especially in border provinces like Yunnan. The most significant is 
the growing number of drug users in this province which increased from 
1.7 percent in 2004 to 11.1 percent in 2007 also during this time the age of 
narcotics users dropped rapidly.16 Since in Myanmar: “narcotics have be­
13 Kudo, op. cit.
14  See: David Arnott, China -  Burma Relations, in: Challenges to Democratization in Bur­
ma: Perspectives on multilateral and bilateral responses, International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) 2001, p. 69-86, http://www.idea.int/asia_pa- 
cific/burma/upload/challenges_to_democratization_in_burma.pdf (June 28, 2012).
15 Bertil Linter, Drugs and Economic Growth. Ethnicity and Exports, in: Burma: Prospects 
fo r  Democratic Future, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
1998, p. 173.
16 China's Myanmar Dilemma...
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come the country’s single most important export”17 there are no prospects 
for a change. Especially that many corrupted Chinese officials have been 
involved in this drug business.
The other stage of economic relations between China and Myanmar is 
the Chinese cooperation in mining, oil, gas, hydropower and infrastruc­
ture. According to the research made by nongovernmental EarthRights 
International (ERI) in Myanmar there are at least 69 Chinese multina­
tional corporations involved in at least 90 hydropower, oil and natural gas, 
and mining projects in Burma.18 Chinese corporations have been involved 
in 63 hydropower projects including the largest 7,100 megawatt Tasang 
Dam on the Salween River,19 is going to be integrated into the Asian De­
velopment Bank’s Greater Mekong Sub-region Power Grid in the future. 
What is interesting in this project is that most of the electricity is destined 
for export to the neighboring Thailand.20 In the Kachin State, several Chi­
nese MNCs are involved in the construction of seven large dams along 
the N ’Mai Hka, Mali Hka, and Irrawaddy River, according to the agree­
ment signed in 2007 between China Power Investment Co. and Myanmar 
authorities.21 China is also involved in mining industries and gas and oil 
companies. Mining is often located in areas where access is restricted, so 
our knowledge about this type of Chinese projects is very poor. According 
to foreign researchers the most important sphere of the Chinese influence 
in Burma is the Chinese activity in exploitations o f oil, natural gas and 
also construction o f pipelines. The longest pipeline, which is now being 
constructed, will lead from Kyaukphyu to Kunming or Chongqing. In the 
future this and other pipelines would help China facilitate import of oil 
and natural gas from the Middle East, South America and Africa. It has a 
strategic meaning for China resource safety during the time when trans­
port through Malacca Straits is dangerous because of piracy.
Chinese military assistance in Burma has begun since the visit of Gen­
erals Khin Nyunt and Than Shwe to Beijing in October 1989.22 After this 
visit SLORC purchased as much as 1 billion USD worth of weapons from 
China, which is the largest arms deal in Burma’s history. These weapons 
included fighter aircrafts, patrol boats, tanks, armored personnel carri­
ers, missiles, anti-aircraft guns, and trucks. China soon became the larg-
17 Linter, op. cit., p. 178.
18 China in Burma: The Increasing Investm ent o f  Chinese M ultinational Corporations in 
Burma's Hydropower, OH and Natural Gas, and Mining Sectors, Earth Right Organization, Sep­
tember 2008, http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/China_in_Burma-ERI.pdf (June 28, 2012).
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 China in Burma..., op. cit.
22 Marvin C. Ott, From Isolation to Relevance. Policy Considerations, in: Burma: Prospects 
fo r  Democratic Future..., p. 72.
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est supplier of arms to Burma. However, in the mid 1990s, the generals di­
versified their weapons suppliers, which was a response to dissatisfaction 
with the quality of Chinese military weaponry.23 Myanmar authorities 
also believe that it would be better to rely on various sources if the main 
supplier cut them off. Chinese assistance in the construction of military 
facilities that could pave the way for a significant Chinese presence in the 
Indian Ocean according to Andrew Selth flourish in: “a steady stream of 
newspaper stories, scholarly monographs and books that have referred 
inter alia to the existence of Chinese military bases in Burma” which only 
a few: “drew on hard evidence or gave verifiable sources to support their 
claims.”24 When in 2005, the Chairman of the Indian Defence Force’s 
Chiefs o f Staff Committee announced that reports o f a Chinese intelli­
gence facility on one o f Burma’s offshore islands were incorrect and that 
there were no Chinese naval bases in Burma, scholars became more skep­
tical about the Chinese military presence in Myanmar.25 Now it is certain 
that claims about China’s influence in Burma over the past 15 years have 
been greatly exaggerated.
Because of the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ China has developed port facilities 
in the cities stretching from the South China Sea through the Straits of 
Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and towards the Persian Gulf. Ports in 
Hainggyi, Coco, Sittwe, Zadetkyi Kyun, Myeik and Kyaukphyu became 
a part of the Chinese ‘string of pearls’ system.26 Their main aim is to pro­
tect Chinese oil shipments. In these ports China provided assistance in the 
construction of radar, communications upgrade, and refueling facilities.
Another important factor in bilateral relations is the Chinese pressure 
on Burmese ethnic minority. China is trying to prevent Myanmar’s eth­
nic groups from gaining full autonomy. China fears that such precedent 
could rouse nationalist views among the groups on its side o f the bound­
ary. Especially that most of this groups along the border areas o f China 
and Myanmar are related, such as the Shan and Yunnan’s Dai people, 
the Kachin and Yunnan’s Jinpo people, and the Wa on both sides o f the 
border.27 Chinese authorities have also been active in assisting SLORC to 
make ceasefire agreements with border insurgents, especially the Kachin 
Independence Organization, which are one o f the best-organized, best 
equipped and most motivated ethnic rebel group.28 However, a ceasefire
23 China’s M yanmar Dilemma...
24 Andrew Selth, Chinese M ilitary Bases in Burma: The Explosion o f  a Myth, The Griffith 
Asia Institute, Regional Outlook Paper No. 10, 2007.
25 China’s M yanmar D ilem m a ...
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, The Karen Revolution in Burma: Diverse Voices, Uncer­
tain Ends, Singapore: East West Center, 2008, p. IX.
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agreement is not the final solution to Burma’s current rising political 
problem connected with minorities insurgencies. It also cannot stabilize 
the situation on the Chin-Burma border side which is greatly desired by 
China. China is trying to use its relationships with ethnic groups as a buf­
fer and leverage in managing its relationship with the government. For 
example China’s closest relationship is with the Wa, who has the largest 
army. It caused a discontent o f the Myanmar militant regime.29 Although 
this pattern in bilateral, China-Myanmar relationships will not change in 
the near future or they even will not change at all. The Chinese aims are 
first o f all pragmatic. Good relations with both the junta’s government 
and various insurgent movements can easily enable China’s access into 
strategic sources placed in the areas occupied by the government and 
ethnic minorities armies.
Nowadays, Myanmar-China relation becomes the main cause of 
frustration and dissatisfaction for Beijing. China reaction to the Saf­
fron Revolution in 2007 and then a year later in May, when the mili­
tary junta denied the access for national aid agencies and aid workers 
to the victims of the Cyclone Nargis, shows Beijing’s great discontent. 
From Beijing’s point o f view, especially in 2008, the timing could not 
have been worse, just three months before the Olympics. Furthermore 
this crisis did not change anything in the attitude o f the junta’s generals. 
The government in Naypyidaw is intensely nationalistic and resistant to 
foreign interference. It does not have a rational perception of foreigners 
and international relations. General Than Shwe, who played the main 
role in policy making, is considered to be particularly unpredictable and 
superstitious, similar to one o f his great predecessors Gen. Ne Win30. 
The military regime is capricious, unreliable and suffers from the lack 
of transparency. Its decision to relocate the capital to Naypyidaw in No­
vember 2005 caused consternation and anger in Beijing.31 A  similar situ­
ation took place when Gen. Khin Nyunt’s proChina policy led to doubts 
about his loyalty and ended in his elimination. Until that, the Chinese 
leaders believed that Khin Nyunt could have become a statesman and 
they called him ‘Deng Xiaoping of Burma.’32 Burma’s geostrategic posi­
tion makes this country the most important part o f the Chinese strategy 
directed to Southeast Asia. Myanmar is also important in the context of 
being for China the a key to revive its ‘southwest silk road’, which origi-
29 China's M yanm ar Dilemma...
30 See: David Martin Jones, The Southeast Asia Developm ent Model. Non-Liberal Dem oc­
racy with Market Accountability, Southeast Asian Affairs, 2007; Diane Mahler, Than Shwe's 
Burma, Minneapolis: Twenty First Century Books, 2010, p. 73.
3 1 China's M yanm ar Dilem m a ...
32 Ibid .
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nally led from the Yunnan Province to Myanmar and westward to Ban­
gladesh, India and the West. However Myanmar has posed an increasing 
challenge to China’s global diplomacy and international image with its 
irresponsible political behavior. In my opinion, Myanmar’s strong sense 
o f nationalism and its determination to preserve its independence and 
cultural identity, guarantee that it will not become a ‘Chinese puppet’ 
like some scholars would like to see it. But without Chinese political 
and economical help, especially long-term loans with low interest rates 
the Myanmar government could not resist an internal political crisis. 
Strengthened economic ties with China are for the regime a chance to 
survive economic sanctions o f Western nations. China’s policy towards 
Myanmar is based on the principles established at the Bandung Confer­
ence. The principles are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s in­
ternal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.33 
From China’s point o f view, which is based on its past experience, sanc­
tions punish people more than governments. Rejecting tactics o f isola­
tion and sanctions in case o f Myanmar is connected with Beijing’s belief 
that political change must be gradual and is best promoted by engage­
ment and encouraging economic development. However, Chinese assis­
tance will not be a powerful force promoting the process o f broad-based 
economic development in Myanmar. Burma’s relationship with China 
preserves an incompetent and repressive order, and puts the country 
in economic and political stagnation. On the other side o f the border, 
Burma stands in the Chinese perspective, in the way of regional develop­
ment and is the main ‘exporter’ o f HIV/AIDS and drugs to China.34
China’s support for the military regime in Burma has had negative 
consequences for both countries. However, geostrategic interests o f the 
both countries are currently stronger than disadvantages o f these re­
lationships. Due to the different scenarios the situation in Burma can 
develop in various ways. According to the most pessimistic, Myanmar 
is playing with fire, seeking closer military, strategic and economic ties 
with China. It can lead the state into a quasi colonial dependence on 
China and Rangoon will become a strategic satellite base for China, like 
it was for the British Empire 150 years ago. However according to Poon
33 See: See Seng Tan, Am itav Acharya, Bandung Revisited Offers a Critical Reassessment o f  
the Intellectual, Social, and Political Legacies o f  the 1955 Asian-African Conference by Drawing 
on Research in Area Studies, Diplomatic History, and International Relations, Singapore: Na­
tional University o f Singapore, 2008, p. 13, 135; Pobzeb Vang, Five Principles o f  Chinese Foreign 
Policies, Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2008, p. 32.
34 Poon Kim Shee, “The Political Economy o f China-Myanmar Relations: Strategic and 
Economic Dimensions,” Ritsumeikan A nnual Review o f  International Studies, The Internatio­
nal Studies Association o f Ritsumeikan University, Vol. 1, 2002, p. 33-53.
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Kim Shee: “Sino-Myanmar ties are uneven, asymmetrical but neverthe­
less reciprocal and mutually beneficial” and the entente is not a tributary 
relationship but rather “a marriage of convenience.”35
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